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ESSAYS

BANAL TIME: WAR AFTER GRAND NARRATIVE
GRAHAM MacPHEE

My heart sank. I thought: My God! [Kissinger is] in the same state
of mind as the rest of them. . . . They each thought that history
started with his administration and that they had nothing to learn
from earlier ones. Yet in fact each administration . . . repeated the
same patterns . . . without even knowing it.
—Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the
Pentagon Papers (2002)

I

The very ubiquity of the POW/MIA flag across the United States makes
it easy to miss.1 Flown over state and federal buildings, post offices, parks,
toll plazas, military posts, and private homes, its image is echoed on pins,
bumper stickers, car decals, license plates, bracelets, bandanas, T-shirts,
caps, knives, and other consumer goods.2 Or perhaps it is more accurate to
say that its ubiquity makes it easy to forget. Historically, the POW/MIA
movement contributed to a new popular attitude to military involvement
in Southeast Asia that allowed the Nixon presidency to extend the war in
Vietnam and launch invasions into Cambodia and Laos (Franklin 1993,
48). It helped foster this mood by enabling the dissipation of temporal
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connection, the links between what had been done or gone before and the
present of recognition. As Jonathan Schell observed as the war came to a
close, “many people were persuaded that the United States was fighting in
Vietnam in order to get its prisoners back. . . . Following [Nixon’s] lead,
people began to speak as though the North Vietnamese had kidnapped
four hundred Americans and the United States had gone to war to retrieve
them” (1975, 76).
As various commentators have noted, the affective disposition signaled
by the turn to the plight of prisoners of war dissolved the sense of temporal
connection required by historical inquiry and the investigation of political
responsibility.3 But what is so striking about Schell’s observation is that it
suggests that the dissipation of history and causality enabled by this new
disposition did not simply result in an ahistorical moment or perpetual
present, a vertiginous loss of meaning and identity.4 Instead, the sense
of loss, disorientation, and anger which it engendered intimates some
kind of story—or perhaps better, intimates a hunch, a powerful but fuzzy
sense of meaningfulness fleetingly intuited or half-glimpsed: that of the
righteousness of the hurt and betrayal evoked by the “kidnapping” of
hundreds of Americans by a foreign force, and the urgency of resentment
against those who would deny the very fact of this feeling, its immediacy
here and now in lived experience. I will argue that this new temporal
nexus is not the atemporal disruption or suspension of narrative imagined
by contemporary theory, but the banal time of endless war.5
The premise of this essay is that the banal time signaled by the
affective disposition of “POW/MIA” exceeds the opposition between
grand narrative and the disruption of the time of representation that
has become axiomatic for contemporary theory.6 This banal temporality
can be traced in the rhizomatic, lateral penetration of POW/MIA
within everyday American culture, but it can also be observed in the
conditions of apperception exhibited by the decision-making of practical
intellectuals within the political and military bureaucracy. It is this disand re-articulation of temporality, I contend, that is recognized with such
a jolt by Daniel Ellsberg on reading the entirety of the Pentagon Papers.7
As Ellsberg recounts, what shocked him out of his own complicity in the
planning and justification of the war in Southeast Asia was not the study’s
detailing of the empirical evidence, the facts, of recent military operations:
the later volumes of the study, he recalls, “held few surprises for me” (2002,
274). Rather, it was the volumes covering 1945 to 1960, and especially those
covering the immediate postwar period, that provoked his reconceptualization of his own role in the bureaucracy and his ethical and political
decision to leak the Pentagon Papers (256). What prompts Ellsberg into
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action is not the revelation of a “secret” about the savagery or illegality
of current operations, nor an insight into the extent and profundity of
the suffering inflicted by US military power.8 It is rather the stunning
realization delivered by the early volumes of the Pentagon study—that “it
had all happened before” (2002, 300; emphasis added).9
To think through this banal time I turn not to a text that engages
directly with the American war in Southeast Asia or the series of invasions,
interventions, proxy wars, or covert operations that have followed in
its wake, but to Christopher Nolan’s neo-noir movie Memento (2000).
Through the experience of a protagonist who cannot form new long-term
memories, Memento dramatizes the apperceptive condition described by
Ellsberg, in which “the same patterns” are “repeated . . . without even
knowing it” (2002, 347). As Greg Grandin demonstrates in his insightful
recent study Kissinger’s Shadow, Henry Kissinger’s “imperial existentialism”
rejects historical analysis as a disabling master narrative that locks agency
in the prison house of determination. “Reporters and academics might have
been obsessively digging up facts that proved the United States overthrew
this democratic government or funded this repressive regime,” Grandin
writes, but Kissinger “persevered in insisting that the past shouldn’t limit
the country’s range for options in the future” (2015, 13). As Kissinger said
himself: “In reaching a decision, [the statesman] must inevitably act on
the basis of an intuition that is inherently unprovable. If he insists on
certainty, he runs the danger of becoming a prisoner of events” (quoted in
Grandin 2015, 32).
I argue here that Kissinger’s opposition—between a cumulative,
deterministic temporality that makes decision “a prisoner of events”
and “an intuition” unencumbered by temporal connectivity—finds a
discomforting echo in the abstract opposition of master narrative and
the temporality of disruption that has become so sedimented within
contemporary theory that it functions as an almost unacknowledged
structuring principle. In the terms of this assumption, the narrating of
historical connectedness can only be construed as a totalizing violence;
while conversely whatever disrupts, subverts, destabilizes, or resists
such violent master narratives is in and of itself liberatory. Or as Homi
Bhabha put it so succinctly, “freedom’s basis” is “in the indeterminate”
(1991). But what if indeterminacy is also subject to determination, albeit
in ways that it cannot recognize and towards outcomes it cannot chart,
evaluate, or anticipate? And what if such unacknowledged determination
can only be brought to appearance in the distortions and warps revealed
in the temporal connectivity that we have already ruled out as ineluctably
complicit with the violence of grand narrative? 10
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II

In The Deaths of Others, John Tirman catalogues how America’s declared
wars of the postwar period have “led to the killing of an astonishing
number of innocent people” (2011, 11). This assessment leads him to pose a
series of guiding questions:
Why: why were civilians so badly mistreated? Why does this mistreatment
persist under US political and military leadership? And why are Americans
so indifferent to these massive human tragedies? (Tirman 2011, 6)

These questions may seem obvious (if by no means otiose), yet as Tirman
notes their interrogation “has been missing from public discourse and
academic studies alike.” “Most academic treatments of war,” he writes,
“look at causes, behavior of states, military strategies, effects on other
states, and the like.” And while “some interest in analyzing genocide is
surfacing, . . . it has little to do with America” (7). Equally, he remarks
that “the very topic of culpability for civilian deaths is essentially out of
bounds in the echo chamber of Washington political discourse, and thus
the idea that civilian casualties are unsettling to the American public
and that the resultant outrage serves as a check on military behavior is
nonsense” (13). In reference to the study he commissioned for the MIT
Center for International Studies in 2006, which “found . . . 650,000 ‘excess
deaths’ attributable to” the US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, Tirman
reports that “the public indifference was glaring, and in my view needs to
be investigated in tandem with the indifference of policy elites” (10, 11). It
“is not in dispute,” he avers, “that American elites and the broader public do
not seem to care much about innocent bystanders in the wars we begin” (6).
As regards policy and practice, Tirman concludes that “there has
been, in effect, a two-tiered system,” which presents “a policy that avows
to uphold the Geneva Conventions” while simultaneously pursuing
“an unacknowledged practice with priorities that frequently victimize
civilians, people who are discardable because they are ‘gooks’ or ‘hajis’ or,
simply, ‘savages’” (2011, 11). Significantly, however, while he is confident
in his conclusions about the data and the clear disparity between policy
and practice, Tirman is more cautious in answering the last of his guiding
questions, as to “why . . . Americans [are] so indifferent to these massive
human tragedies” (6). For answers he points to terrain that those of us who
work in cultural history and critical theory will be more familiar with.
Namely, that such indifference results in part from the organizational
power within discourse of the master narratives of nation and imperial
civilization and the ontologies or essentialisms they underpin: “the old
tropes of the frontier [and] the civilizing mission of American force,”
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in Tirman’s formulation (12). Under the determinative power of these
narratives of presence, self-identity, and closure, “the topic of culpability for
very large-scale civilian suffering is deflected by reference to the essential
rightness of the war, its ultimate benefits to those very populations under
siege, and the good intentions of Americans abroad” (8). But while these
ontologies of certainty and essence are surely in play, Tirman cannot find
in them a sufficient answer that will satisfy the affective “indifference, or
diffidence” that is so striking to him. For the vista he surveys is not one
where Enlightenment discourses of reason, or nation, or civilization—
with their universalizing claims to representation and narrative coherence
based in the onto-theological—are paramount, even if they continue to
fulfill a supporting role. Rather, what presents itself most insistently and
urgently to Tirman’s view is “an absence of discourse,” an absence that is
alternately “reinforced by or causative of public indifference” (12).
Given that the contribution of Enlightenment discourses of nation and
civilization fails to fully account for the affective condition of “passive
denial” that he identifies, Tirman points to the need for thinking a
supplement or excess beyond the discursive parameters of master narrative.
Such narratives are indeed involved to some extent, it is made clear (see
2011, 344–54); but they cannot on their own provide an explanation or
basis for analysis that would adequately grasp the specific character of
this condition. Taking the terms “cultural” and “political” as synonyms
for such grand narratives and as external to the processes of subjectivity
(understood as the “psychological”), Tirman argues that “the denial is not
merely cultural or political; it is psychological—avoidance of the trauma
of so many dead, wounded, and displaced, and even reactions leading to
blaming the victim” (12).
What seems especially valuable about Tirman’s analysis is its
identification within this historical condition of “denial” and “blaming”
of a dimension that goes beyond the master narratives of nation and
civilization, “the old tropes of the frontier [and] the civilizing mission of
American force” (2011, 12). And it is this element that I want to address
here by turning to the banal time of POW/MIA. I do not, however, follow
his sense of the easy separability of the “cultural” and “political” on the
one hand and the “psychological” on the other. Indeed, the temporality of
denial and blame that I identify here is deeply bound up with cultural and
political histories that are not acknowledged or remembered.
As Steven Casey recounts, the POW/MIA issue emerged as a result
of the Nixon administration’s “Go Public” campaign begun soon after
the new president’s inauguration in 1969, a publicity initiative that
was designed to “marshal public opinion” against the domestic antiwar
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movement. The administration “wanted a positive rallying cry to energize
[its] base,” and “the issue of American POWs seemed ideal” (2014, 197). In
light of election promises to pursue “the quest for peace” (Franklin 1993,
45), Nixon sought to justify the expansion of the war in Southeast Asia
“by emphasizing that the United States would fight until every prisoner
was returned” (Casey 2014, 197). H. Bruce Franklin argues that the crucial
step in retooling an ostensibly humanitarian issue into a pretext for the
potentially endless extension of the war was the fusing of two distinct
categories, that of “prisoner of war” (POW) and “missing in action”
(MIA). A large proportion of those listed as MIA were in fact internally
categorized by the Pentagon as “killed in action/body not recovered” (KIA/
BNR): that is, such combatants were known to be dead but due to the
nature of combat conditions their bodies had not been retrieved or were
not retrievable (1993, 13). While to popular audiences the category “missing
in action” implied that the fate of each individual was still uncertain and
so held a range of different possible futures, in fact the Pentagon knew full
well that many classified as “missing” were dead, and were not and could
never be prisoners of war. But the list provided by the United States to the
Vietnamese at the Paris talks in 1969 quite deliberately conflated what had
until then been quite distinct categories: “We are holding the Communist
authorities in Southeast Asia responsible for every individual on this list
whether or not he is internally classified by the services as captured or missing”
(quoted in Franklin 1993, 68; emphasis added). At a stroke, uncertainty
was restored to all those categorized as “missing”—even those known to
be “killed in action/body not recovered”—since all were now potentially
“captured” or “prisoners of war.” The futures of those known to be dead
were retroactively reawakened and refigured as open and still negotiable.
At the same time, this uncertainty erased the historical circumstances
of each death by delinking it from the nexus of events in which it took
place. In fusing the categories of POW and MIA, the fact of absence was
retrospectively recast within a new temporal configuration, becoming a
perpetual present or eternal moment of possibility suspended between
life and death. As such, the demand made upon the Vietnamese became
impossible, since it involved accounting for the ahistorical and uncertain
futurity of those already dead: the removal of uncertainty would require
the retrieval of bodies shot down and lost over the sea, abandoned years
ago in remote jungle, or obliterated by high explosives. The war could
never be concluded, for how could there ever be “peace” without “honor”?11
If the POW/MIA issue was engineered by the Nixon administration
and closely calibrated to the extension of the war, it very quickly provided a
nexus for popular dynamics that would exceed such official organizational
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direction. The National League of POW/MIA Families was formed
in May of 1970 (NLPMF 2015a) during the administration’s invasion
of neutral Cambodia, and was at the outset funded and encouraged by
figures close to the administration (Allen 2009, 33–40, 57–60; Franklin
1993, 50–57). It was the League that commissioned the POW/MIA flag,
with its bowed head in silhouette against barbed wire and a watchtower
and its legend “You are not forgotten,” which began to circulate widely in
early 1972 (NLPMF 2015b). But once the prisoners of war were returned
in Operation Homecoming the following year and discrepancies (deaths
in captivity and unanticipated returnees) were accounted for by the
Vietnamese authorities (Allen 2009, 94–95), a core of POW/MIA activists
refused to accept Pentagon determinations of death for those previously
listed as MIA (140–54). And they demanded that officials “cease using
such phrases as ‘all POWs returned’” (97). As one sister of a combatant
listed as MIA wrote to Nixon, “I still can’t realize that we only got so few
back. I feel they are holding back more” (quoted in Allen 2009, 97). With
the unwinding of the project of endless war in Southeast Asia, the public
relations strategy designed to garner support for it now became a liability,
fuelling distrust of the very administration that had sought to manage
popular feelings of hurt and loss.
What retrospectively proved that betrayal was anterior and not
subsequent was President Ford’s “support for the ‘earned re-entry’ of
draft evaders and military deserters” (Allen 2009, 138). For the POW/
MIA activists, the refusal to serve was especially significant as it was a
betrayal of the missing by the nation that had occurred prior to combat
and the possibility of capture. The draft evaders were therefore intimately
and irrevocably linked to the fate of the missing, since these were the
very forces that had already betrayed those left behind even before their loss.
Their rehabilitation by Ford was then a doubling of betrayal, a repetition
and retrospective endorsement of an anterior act of treachery. As the
League’s executive director wrote to the President, it is “inconceivable
that our Commander-in-Chief would show greater concern . . . for those
who chose to leave the United States . . . than he does for over 1,300 US
Servicemen who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.” “Our men,”
the letter insists, “have earned their re-entry whether they be alive and
walking or in a casket,” unlike the “dodgers and deserters” prioritized by
the government. Therefore, amnesty should only “have been considered
[after] (1) the return of all POWs from Southeast Asia, (2) the fullest
possible accounting of all Missing-in-Action, and, (3) the fullest possible
repatriation of the remains of all servicemen who died, serving our
country” (quoted in Allen 2009, 138).
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The uncertainty or openness to futurity accorded to the dead (“whether
they be alive and walking or in a casket”) fixes one moment in the past
(the moment of “cho[osing] to leave the United States”) as definitive and
unable to be atoned for or expurgated. The nation is already marked by
inauthenticity and treachery in the form of those who left the country to
avoid the draft, and they must be excluded from the nation indefinitely,
until all uncertainty is resolved (“the fullest possible accounting,” “the
fullest possible repatriation”). Thus, the indeterminacy instituted by the
POW/MIA complex both erases history and fixes the future by instituting
a temporality of perpetual repetition. Redefined as indeterminate in the
typographical slash that conjoins POW and MIA, each “killed in action/
body not recovered” death is removed from the events in which it occurred
and recast as potentially open. Conversely, each case of draft evasion is
removed from its context of occurrence to be recast as a moment that is
irredeemable and perpetually the same. The indeterminacy of the POW/
MIA complex requires a process of accounting or empirical verification,
but this process is itself impossible to conclude and must be repeated
endlessly, again and again.
Politically, this indeterminacy underpinned both the initial potency
of the POW/MIA issue for the administration and the movement’s
subsequent hostility to all attempts by subsequent administrations to
direct or contain it. Successive administrations (notably under Reagan) and
various Congressional figures repeatedly sought to harness the persistent
sense of betrayal articulated by the League, shaping foreign relations
around the issue, holding official investigations, and according POW/MIA
iconography privileged legal status.12 Yet for all this official endorsement,
the result domestically has been to multiply feelings of anger, resentment,
distrust, and cynicism that hold establishment politics in contempt. As
Michael J. Allen remarks, in escaping its initial sponsorship by the Nixon
administration, the POW/MIA complex was transformed into the engine
of a powerful sense of hostility to establishment politics that has “sparked
an aggrieved nationalism [which] has yet to abate” (2009, 140).13 But if this
is an “aggrieved nationalism,” it is one that proves profoundly unsettling
for the temporal schema of the grand narrative that has become so deeply
embedded in contemporary theory and for the conception of the nation
that has been built upon it.
III

Famously, Homi Bhabha rewrites the nation as master narrative by
describing two incommensurable temporal modes.14 The first is “national
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time,” the “homogenous, visual time” that is “associated with the nation’s
imagined community,” the “people” (Bhabha 2004, 205, 206). Such a
“visualization of time” operates as a “structuring process” or grand narrative.
In this connection, Bhabha quotes Mikhail Bakhtin’s characterization of
the dominant narrative temporality in Goethe’s writing: “the necessity of
the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development
. . . finally the aspect of the past being linked to the future” (quoted in
Bhabha 2004, 205). In this necessary narrative sequence, with its rigid
chain of cause and effect, “national time becomes concrete and visible.”
But according to Bhabha, the revelation that “the nation’s visual presence
is the effect of a narrative struggle” enables the emergence of a different
temporal mode that “interrupts the self-generating time of national
production and disrupts the signification of the people as homogenous”
(205, 212). The recognition of “the nation as narration” deconstructs such
“visual presence,” exposing the violence and suppression inherent in the
nation’s placid claim to be merely the self-expression of a “homogenous”
people (204, 212).
This other, deconstructive mode emerges from within “national
time,” as the moment of disruption inherent in narrative’s inability to be
self-identical and present to itself (Bhabha 2004, 205). Strictly speaking
it is not a mode of temporality as such, but is rather the suspension of
temporal drive and connectivity: it is the “process of iterative ‘unpicking’”
in which “new forms of identification . . . confuse the continuity of
historical temporalities, confound the ordering of cultural symbols, [and]
traumatize tradition” (265, 257). It is “a pulsional incident, the split-second
movement when the process of the subject’s designation—its fixity—
opens up beside it”; it is a “supplementary space of contingency” that
“does not require a temporality of continuity or accumulation; it requires
direction and contingent closure but no teleology and holism.” Thus,
according to Bhabha, the homogenous time of the master narrative of
nation is perennially disrupted, opened up, undone, by the “pulsional . . .
split-second movement” that inheres in its own claim to narrative mastery
(265). And “this narrative inversion or circulation . . . makes untenable any
supremacist or nationalist claims to mastery, for the position of narrative
control is neither monocular nor monologic” (215).
It is, however, difficult to square the projection of the nation implied
by the affective disposition of POW/MIA with the master narrative of
“national time.” Bhabha’s framework depends on a “monologic” temporality
of “narrative control” that is to be deconstructed again and again in a
“pulsional . . . split-second movement” (215, 265): this temporal disruption
ruptures the homogeneity of the nation secured through “the continuity
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of historical temporalities, . . . the ordering of cultural symbols,” and the
necessity of “tradition” (257). But the affective disposition of POW/MIA
does not call on the imaginary of the nation narrating itself as full presence.15
There is no claim to a “narrative control” that is either “monocular” or
“monologic” (215) because this disposition abjures that there ever was a
nation that could narrate itself as whole and integral. The betrayal of
the nation is not subsequent but, as we have seen, anterior, always already
there—in the antiwar protesters, draft evaders, media commentators,
establishment politicians, and intellectuals who have already betrayed
the missing and who are now belatedly (Nachträglich) enabled to narrate
the “nation” as (and to) themselves. The impossibility of the nation’s
self-identity—of the nation as the self-expression of a homogenous
“people”—is consciously thematized, not deconstructively revealed.
Which is why all accounting for discrepancies, the return of remains, or
official determinations of death are irrelevant and beside the point. That
no verifiable evidence of secret captives has ever been produced and no
plausible rationale for the retention of an elaborate secret prison system by
impoverished and war-damaged postcolonial states has ever been adduced
does not in any way hamper the POW/MIA complex. Because there is no
truth “out there” to be discovered—it is rather a feeling or disposition “in
here,” half-glimpsed and half-remembered, partial and unverifiable, but
with that deep undertow of intuition that is more affectively powerful
than epistemological certainty.
This affective power can be seen in the way that the POW/MIA nexus
reverses the poles of victim and perpetrator and all but erases the deaths
of others. It is not possible to know the exact number of deaths resulting
from the American war in Southeast Asia due to the circumstances in
which it was fought. But as Nick Turse reports, “the most sophisticated
analysis yet of wartime mortality in Vietnam, a 2008 study by researchers
from Harvard Medical School and the Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation at the University of Washington, suggested that a reasonable
estimate might be 3.8 million violent war deaths, combatant and civilian”—
although “there are good reasons to believe that even this staggering
figure may be an underestimate” (2013, 13). Deaths resulting from US
military intervention in Cambodia are estimated at between 600,000
and 800,000, and those for Laos at 1 million (Tirman 2012). Vietnamese
government records, although incomplete, indicate that there are still
300,000 Vietnamese military personal listed as missing (Turse 2013, 12).
It is estimated that 180,000 people in South Vietnam were arrested under
the CIA’s Phoenix program, and at its height in 1968 and 1969 about 7,000
were probably killed (Tirman 2011, 52). Thousands of noncombatants were
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held in South Vietnam’s Con Son Island prison complex between 1954 and
1975, and over this period around 20,000 died there, “many of them from
torture and abuse” (Tucker 2011, 232). Since the war, deaths continue to be
recorded in all three countries as a result of unexploded munitions, while
the Vietnamese government claims that 500,000 children have been born
with birth defects as a result of toxic chemicals used as defoliants (275).
The continuing ubiquity of the POW/MIA flag stands in sharp relief to
the widespread indifference to these realities (Tirman 2011, 174–75, 337–342).
Central to the affective disposition of POW/MIA is the construction of
an injured sensibility that speaks simultaneously as both national hero and
victim of the nation’s betrayal. This sensibility was extended to cover all
of the US dead in President Ronald Reagan’s eulogy at the Vietnam War
Memorial in 1988: “For too long a time, they stood in a chill wind, as
if in a winter’s night watch. And in that night, their deeds spoke to us,
but we knew them not. And their voices called to us, but we heard them
not” (quoted in Tirman 2011, 181). Limning the affective disposition of
POW/MIA, Reagan’s speech not only erases the histories of US violence
(now inflicted exclusively upon US combatants) but evaporates alterity so
as to direct the call for recognition entirely within. This redistribution
of the poles of perpetrator and victim defines violence within a temporal
construction of betrayal that is unhomely. Violence is done to a wounded
and incomplete subjectivity (the “they”) by a people (the “we”) that has
failed to narrate itself as nation through the medium of “their deeds” and
heroism (“we knew them not” and “heard them not”). Yet those so betrayed
cannot be construed as the “real” or “authentic” nation that would strive
to recall its prior fullness, the lost presence to which its telos seeks return.
For this wounded, nonidentical subjectivity is always already subject to
violence, it has always already been betrayed by the nation’s failure to assume
the “narrative control” that would constitute it as nation (Bhabha 2004,
215).16 And this is the temporal basis for the intense and violent anger of
this affective disposition. There is no home, no origin, no nation to be
recovered, or restored, or returned—for it was never there.
Yet if this affective disposition cannot claim the narrative authority
of the nation, it is not simply the punctual disruption of “nation time,”
the opening of a “supplementary space of contingency” that would undo
the connectivity of historical remembrance and tradition and so “mak[e]
untenable any supremacist or nationalist claims to mastery” (Bhabha 1993,
265, 215). For there is a kind of atmospheric meaningfulness or situational
implication of meaning at work here, a premonition or intuitive feeling that
enables a mode of analogical association or linking of temporal events that
is neither master narrative nor pure contingency and dispersal. Rather, it
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might be traced or adumbrated as the implicit “logic” or directionality of
its habituated, sedimented intuitions—or what might be termed the little
stories or petits récits that it tells itself (see MacPhee 2011a, 198–99; 2015,
252). Such an affective disposition may not be enough to narrate a coherent
vision of the nation, to establish “the necessity of the past and the necessity
of its place in a line of continuous development” (quoted in Bhabha 2004,
205). But it would be well able to sustain reiterations of anger, resentment,
and violence against targets that need not be understood or identified with
certainty, but would merely need to be apprehended as signs, or marks, or
half-glimpsed memories of the always already betrayal of the nation.
IV

Christopher Nolan’s neo-noir Memento (2000) has attracted academic
interest for its exploration of time and memory, most notably in terms of
philosophical considerations of moral responsibility in light of its extreme
qualification of individual agency (see Kania 2009). Productive though
that focus may be, my consideration of the film here is slightly different.
I am less concerned with its portrayal of the moral culpability of the
individual agent per se, and more with the potential for violence it locates
in banal time after grand narrative.
The film is centered on the disorientating experience of its protagonist
Leonard Shelby, a former insurance investigator who is driven to seek
vengeance for an earlier “incident” (Nolan 2001, 176), a home invasion in
which he believes his wife Catherine was raped and murdered and he was
left brain damaged. In Leonard’s testimony, while his memory of events
prior to the assault is intact, the resulting physical injury has caused
anterograde amnesia, which means he cannot now make new long-term
memories and can retain short-term memories for only ten to fifteen
minutes. As he explains to the clerk at his motel, “I know who I am and
all about myself, but since my injury I can’t make any new memories.
Everything fades. If we talk for too long, I’ll forget how we started. I
don’t know if we’ve ever met before and the next time I see you I won’t
remember this conversation” (114). However, this residual sense of self,
and the memories of his life prior to the incident he associates with that
sense of self, provide him with a purpose—revenge. Contrary to the
official investigation, he believes that a second assailant, a John or James
G, escaped the crime scene undetected, and he single-mindedly seeks to
track them down and kill them.
Around this memory of loss and betrayal, Leonard constructs an
elaborate system to try and sustain his continuity of action, ranging from
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habits and repeated protocols to a plethora of objects and mementos that
John Sutton calls “exograms” (2009, 69): prosthetic memory aids that
include captioned Polaroid photographs, file cards, charts, an annotated
police report, and most strikingly an array of messages tattooed on his
body. Leonard is joined at different moments by two characters who claim
to be helping him in his pursuit of vengeance: a policeman or former
policeman named John Edward “Teddy” Gammell, and Natalie, a femme
fatale figure who Leonard comes to feel has undergone a similar loss.
What makes the experience of viewing the film so powerful and its
interpretation so challenging is the way in which its structure incorporates
something of Leonard’s temporal dislocation. Memento has a double
narrative structure, with alternating scenes shot in color and in black and
white. The episodes filmed in color proceed in reverse order, beginning
with Leonard’s killing of Teddy—the final event in the story—and
ending with his earlier killing of the drug dealer Jimmy Grantz, Natalie’s
boyfriend: each in turn is identified by Leonard as his perpetrator, his John
or James G. These color scenes also incorporate short memory sequences
from Leonard’s point of view—flashbacks to the night of the assault and
fragmentary memories of his wife Catherine. The black and white episodes
proceed chronologically, and involve Leonard explaining his condition
over the phone by narrating the story of Sammy Jankis. In Leonard’s
telling, Sammy Jankis was a case he investigated prior to the incident who
had a similar memory problem, but which was refused payment because
Leonard defined it as psychologically rather than physically based. While
initially difficult to locate in time (Leonard is dressed shabbily and lacks
the scars we seen in the color episodes), we learn by the end of the film
that the black and white sequence immediately precedes the events shot
in color and shown in reverse chronological order. In fact, the story takes
place over just three days, although the plot or discourse interweaves
episodes in a temporal loop or “hairpin” that makes the events feel
temporally distended and the chronology difficult to reconstruct.17 In the
opening episodes, where the connection between black and white and
color sequences is yet to coalesce, viewers lack access to the past we need
to understand situation, action, and character, and like Leonard inhabit a
present that is disconnected from the prior contexts we might draw on to
lend it intelligibility. Without the connectivity to prior events we usually
assume in mainstream narrative cinema, we are left struggling to make
sense of the situation before us, even though the immediacy of action is
clear enough.
The film itself offers for consideration two ostensible ways of overcoming
the dispersal of meaning and the disorientation of subjectivity in time. Or
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rather, it offers two dimensions of narration that we can recognize as aspects
of grand narrative. The first is the narrative contiguity and connectivity of
memory, precisely what the protagonist now lacks. But for Leonard, this
absence has become liberatory, freeing investigation from the historicizing
interpretation that retrospectively remodels the facts to conform to its
unfolding parameters. In reply to Teddy’s warnings about the malleability
of viewpoint without the scaffolding of memory, Leonard declares:
Memory’s not perfect. It’s not even that good. Ask the police; eyewitness
testimony is unreliable. The cops don’t catch a killer by sitting around
remembering stuff. They collect facts, make notes, draw conclusions.
Facts, not memories: that’s how you investigate. . . . Memory can change
the shape of a room or the color of a car. It’s an interpretation, not a record.
Memories can be changed and distorted and they’re irrelevant if you have
facts. (Nolan 2001, 135)

The problem with memory in this sense is that the very connectivity
that would provide the conduit to bring the past into the present “as
it once really was” reshapes that past in terms of the parameters of the
present. Such a historicizing interpretation renders the past as a necessary
anticipation of the meaningfulness of the present, and so flattens out the
very difference of the past that it had hoped to capture. But, of course,
this first dimension of narrative mastery seems to have been definitively
ruled out of court by the film because it appears unavailable to Leonard:
he cannot appeal to the historicizing continuity of memory because of his
anterograde amnesia. It stands rather as a marker for an alternative mode
of experiencing temporality that is said to have been lost.
The second approach to ordering meaning in time arises by way of
Leonard’s appeal to “facts,” which at first sight sounds like a straightforward
empiricism but which in truth offers something quite different. “There are
things you can know for sure,” he tells Natalie: “I know the feel of the
world. . . . I know how this wood will sound when I knock. . . . I know
how this glass will feel when I pick it up.” But as he continues, he begins
to describe “knowledge” as the return or restitution of another time, and
therefore as a “kind of memory”:
Leonard: Certainties. You think its knowledge, but it’s a kind of memory,
a kind you take for granted. I can remember so much.

(runs hands over objects)
I know the feel of the world . . .
(beat)
. . . and I know her.
Natalie: Your wife?
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Leonard: She’s gone and the present is trivia, which I can scribble down
in notes. (Nolan 2001, 144)

The second position, which Leonard claims for himself, is not the
temporally replete empiricism that might be inferred by his language
of “facts” and “certainties.” As Leonard narrates, without a temporal
framework of meaningfulness, such a naïve empiricism reduces “the
present” to “trivia,” a vista of disconnected “facts” to be “scribble[d] down in
notes.” If it is to escape temporal dispersal and be meaningful, any sensory
perception must be anchored in a point of origin, a defining ontological
commitment that subsists prior to the disconnection and dispersal of the
present. What secures his self-identity as subject and supplies the “facts”
that confront him with meaning is the originary memory of Catherine
before the incident, a memory that remains fixed and invulnerable to the
passing of time and so fixes him: “I know her.” This is not, then, naïve
empiricism but rather a phenomenological hermeneutic grounded in “a
kind of memory”—one understood not as continuity in time but as the
return or restitution of origin. “She’s gone,” Leonard affirms bitterly, but
his claim to interpretation, to be able to make the “trivia” of the present
cohere and be meaningful, lies in his ability to recall the memory of his
wife as origin into the present. Such a restitution of origin provides the
ontological grounding that would transform the trash of the present—
his Polaroids, scribblings, tattoos, charts, and other exograms—into a
constellation pregnant with meaning.
Yet if Leonard is denied memory’s element of contiguity and
linkage, then such a restitution of the past within the present becomes
problematic. How is the ontological commitment that is kept invulnerable
in the past to be retrieved and made commensurable within the dispersal
of temporality? And how is the Leonard from before the “incident,”
anchored in the ineradicable memory of his dead wife, to be squared
with the disorientating muddle of sensory signals that constitutes his
lived experience now? Leonard’s answer is through habit, the repetition
of protocols, procedures, and performative patterns that allow him
to continually reestablish a continuity of action and purpose in each
new now. He takes a Polaroid of his residence, his car, the people he
encounters, checking them when he wants to drive somewhere or when he
meets someone, writing short captions on the photographs to prompt his
response. He follows a pattern of reintroduction and familiarization with
each new conversation, probing for clues and leads. Valuable information
is then recorded on scraps of paper or file cards and later assimilated
within the leaked police report, a dog-eared file that in its increasingly
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disordered lattice work of annotations, interpolations, and crosshatchings
has become his research compendium. As Leonard explains on the phone
to his unseen interlocutor:
I was an investigator. I’d investigate claims to see which were phony. . . . I
had to see through people’s bullshit. It was useful experience, because now
it’s my life. When I meet someone, I don’t even know if I’ve met them
before. I have to look in their eyes and just figure them out. My job taught
me the best way to find out what someone knows was to let them talk. . . .
Throw in an occasional “Why?”, but just listen. And watch the eyes, the
body language. . . . It’s complicated. You might catch a sign but attach the
wrong meaning to it. If someone touches their nose while they’re talking,
experts will tell you it means they are lying. It really means they’re nervous,
and people get nervous for all sorts of reasons. It’s all about context. (Nolan
2001, 127; emphasis in original)

Most dramatically, once a series of clues and leads coalesce into certainty,
it is added to the baroque typographical array of details, prompts,
maxims, and warnings that are tattooed onto Leonard’s body. What is
inscribed there, according to this hermeneutical procedure, is not simply
the disparate marks of unconnected moments of lived experience, but a
constellation of restitution or return, the reconstitution of the memory
of origin out of the broken shards of temporal dispersal in the present.
Leonard’s intuition is that as facts are gathered, inscribed, and overlaid, the
resulting constellation will lead him to the missing John G, the perpetrator
responsible for robbing him of the past whose loss now authorizes and
authenticates his quest for vengeance: “He took away the woman I love
and he took away my memory. He destroyed everything; my life and my
ability to live. . . . That’s what keeps me going. It’s all I have” (135).
Except that it is not quite so easy as all that. How is it that Leonard can
develop protocols and procedures that relate only to his condition after
the incident, such as training himself to check his pockets in sequence
for his Polaroids? How is it that he recognizes his tattoos (or indeed
his other exograms) as clues that relate to his search for John G, rather
than as bizarre mutilations or signs of torture (or random messages from
an unknown deceiver)? And how is it that Leonard even knows he has a
“condition” and is able to rehearse a potted account of it for every person
that he encounters? In each case, these would appear to involve some
element of the long-term or persistent memory of situations or behaviors
that occurred after he suffered his anterograde amnesia, the condition that
is supposed to make the formation of such persistent memories impossible.
And doesn’t the development of new protocols, routines, and patterns of
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behavior involve a kind of temporal continuity and contiguity? Indeed,
Leonard himself describes learning by repetition as a way of “physically . . .
making new memories” (Nolan 2001, 179). In which case, these continuities
would be open to the very objections that he explained to Teddy in his
rejection of the historicizing interpretation of memory: that “memory can
change the shape of a room or the color of a car,” that “it’s an interpretation,
not a record,” and that “memories can be changed and distorted” (Nolan
2001, 135). But then how can he be sure that the memory of origin—that
is supposed to be inviolable and unchanging, and which is to give his life
purpose and events meaning—is the past as it really was, and not something
conditioned or learned by repetition, routine, and habit?
Leonard seeks to ward off such questions through the story of Sammy
Jankis and the distinction he draws in its telling between the “physical”
and the “psychological” basis of what appears to be the same disorder
(Nolan 2001, 141). According to this distinction, Sammy’s inability to
respond to “conditioning” or “learning by repetition” (136) showed that
the cause of his disorder was psychological, a function of the work of
memory proper. In contrast, Leonard defines his own ability to generate
new procedures and protocols of behavior as a function of physical modes
of conditioning or training through repetition—modes that he claims
function “not by memory” understood as a psychological capacity “but by
instinct,” understood as a strictly physical dynamic (137). “Conditioning
didn’t work for Sammy, so he became helpless,” he recounts to his phone
caller; “But it works for me. I live the way Sammy couldn’t. Habit and
routine makes my life possible. Conditioning. Acting on instinct” (141).
However, this distinction proves fatal for Sammy’s diabetic wife. Taking
his condition to be “psychological” and therefore reversible, she attempts
to jumpstart Sammy’s memory by asking him repeatedly to administer
her insulin injection in the hope that the mortal danger of an overdose
will force a recrudescence of temporal connectivity. Her wager is lost
as Sammy’s memory stubbornly refuses to cohere and he unwittingly
administers the fatal dose.
However, Memento adroitly and subtly scuppers Leonard’s attempted
solution. Not only does the film collapse the distinction he wants to
make between memory proper (as psychological) and what he defines
as the physical modes of “habit,” “routine,” “conditioning,” and “acting
on instinct” (141), but more tellingly it drains away any possibility of
memory’s restitution of origin. In the pivot scene that comes at the end
of the discourse (but midway in the story), Teddy tells Leonard that his
wife Catherine survived the incident (218), that she was diabetic, and
that “Sammy didn’t have a wife” (219). So the backstory constructed so
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painstakingly both by Leonard and the viewer disintegrates. Of course,
Teddy may be lying, as we have seen him verifiably lie moments before:
he pretends not to know Leonard and calls himself a cop while in the
chronologically prior scene he had claimed to be an informer and subject to
the manipulation of a local police officer (216, 207). Regardless, this doubt
forces us to scrutinize the links we have made or imagined in order to
decipher the plot and make the film meaningful, revealing the uncertainty
already apparent in Leonard’s memory of Catherine. At various moments
through the discourse, we have witnessed in lightning-quick flashbacks
Leonard’s own hand both injecting his wife and alternatively pinching her
thigh; we have seen him remember her blinking after the apparently fatal
assault; and most troublingly, he remembers an image of them together in
bed when he is tattooed with a declaration of the death of John G, a tattoo
that appears nowhere else in the story world of the film.
In returning to his remembrances of Catherine, we realize that
his memories of her before the incident are not intact, inviolable, or
unchanging. And whatever weight we are to give to Teddy’s unsettling
claims, it is clear that Leonard’s memories of his wife, that are to structure
his revenge and give meaning to the disconnection of lived experience,
are far from providing the point of origin or full presence which would
anchor his phenomenological hermeneutic. Although Leonard imputes an
idealized status to his wife and their marriage, as Andrew Kania observes,
“the images that accompany his recollections belie these descriptions.”
The footage we see of her is spare and repetitive, and when Natalie
invites him to “close your eyes, remember her,” the weave of memory
is hazy, indeterminate, and threadbare. Kania remarks that “Catherine
is almost never depicted smiling; rather she seems sad, or even lost—
much like Sammy’s wife after his accident.” It is possible, he notes, “that
these memories are from after the incident, when Catherine was having
trouble dealing with Leonard’s condition” (2009, 171). Notably, Leonard’s
discursive account of the texture of his memories of her and their life
together skirts emotional contact, psychological insight, and empathetic
understanding, claiming only the barest minimum:
You can only feel details. Bits and pieces which you didn’t bother to put
into words. And extreme moments you feel even if you don’t want to. Put
it together and you get the feel of the person, enough to know how much
you miss them, and how much you hate the person who took them away.
(Nolan 2001, 125)

Despite Leonard’s claim that recollection can return “the feel of the
person,” this is not the restitution of origin, of the wholeness of the past as
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the ground that would anchor and make meaningful the dereliction and
dispersal of the present. Rather, it resembles more closely the habituated
memory or intuition (“I know how this glass will feel when I pick it up”)
that he tells us “makes my life possible” (144, 141). And in the scenes where
Leonard hires an escort to reenact his awakening without his wife on
the night of the assault, we witness his conditioning of his own habitual
memory—not to recapture the warmth or closeness of their relationship
but to reinforce or reimagine the incident as the temporal marker of
Catherine’s loss. The memory that is so affectively tenacious is not the
restitution of origin in its fullness and self-presence, but the retention
through conditioning and repetition of the “feeling” of absence and the
anger at the half-memory of betrayal: “enough to know how much you
miss them, and how much you hate the person who took them away” (125).
V

If action and decision cannot be orientated within a grand narrative anchored
in the restitution of origin, Memento suggests that they may nonetheless be
determined and configured in the banal time of conditioning, repetition,
habit, feeling, and intuition. Or in the language used earlier in this essay, in
the affective disposition engendered by a hazy but bitterly felt sense of the
loss of a narrative mastery that was never there.
Leonard is not, at least in this respect, like Sammy Jankis, cut adrift in
a perpetual present without continuity or connectivity and so “helpless”
(Nolan 2001, 141)—unable to decide or act under his own direction.
Leonard does make fateful decisions: in crossing out the warning on Natalie’s
photograph and writing in his intuition of her empathy; in deciding to
annotate Teddy’s picture with “DON’T BELIEVE HIS LIES”; in burning
the Polaroids of Jimmy’s corpse and of himself after killing an earlier John
G; in tearing up the file card recording “TATTOO: I’VE DONE IT”; and
most irrevocably, in writing Teddy’s car license number on a file card under
the legend “TATTOO: FACT 6.” “I am not a killer,” Leonard tells himself
while still retaining the short-term memory of killing Jimmy Grantz, “but
right now I need to be” (223). In the unfolding of events we have already
witnessed, we know that these decisions will lead to the identification of
Teddy—John Edward Gammell—as the next John G, the next (and latest)
object of Leonard’s justified anger and violent revenge. And in the moment
of decision, so does Leonard.
How are we to understand the temporal genesis of such decisions? What
contexts of deliberation and judgment are operative if Leonard’s decision is
not organized by an originary grand narrative, as the inviolable return of the
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self who had loved Catherine? For the Leonard who makes these decisions
is not that person; and yet he is not “helpless” like Sammy Jankis, deprived
of continuity and so agentless. As we have seen, decision does not take place
as an indeterminate “pulsional . . . split-second movement” (Bhabha 2004,
265), but emerges within the sedimented intuitions that accumulate through
the practices and protocols of repetition, conditioning, and habit exhibited
time and again through the film. In which case, decision is conditioned by
the implicit “logic” or directionality of Leonard’s habituated intuitions, by
what we have called his affective disposition. As Teddy smirks: “Like you’ve
told yourself. Over and over. Conditioning yourself to believe. ‘Learning
through repetition’” (Nolan 2001, 218). But although Leonard’s decision is
conditioned by the past, it cannot recognize its own happening as conditioning,
habit, and routine, its own process as the patterning and orientation of
intuition. And because it cannot acknowledge the past of its determination,
it cannot evaluate the outcomes of this determination. As Hannah
Arendt notes, “relentless activity allows responsibility to evaporate”: for
responsibility “can only develop in the moment when a person reflects—
not on himself, but on what he’s doing” (2013, 59–60; emphasis added).
In Arendt’s sense, Leonard is an image of “functioning” (44).18 As she
explains in an interview with Joachim Fest, “functioning” is a response to
the atomization and decay of social texture in modernity, which produces
the feeling of being “powerless, however strong you may be.” Functioning
offers the “feeling of power that arises from acting together” (43) while
simultaneously “eliminate[ing]” all the “discussing things together, reaching
certain decisions, accepting responsibility, thinking about what we are
doing” that is involved in acting together in the political sense (44). In the
moment of his killing of Teddy which opens the film, Leonard will once
again be unburdened by the memory of his own prior acts, repetitions, and
decisions. And so he will be able to dispatch the perpetrator, whose guilt is
known intuitively, with the innocent ruthlessness of the wronged victim as
if for the first time—jamais vu.19
Leonard’s ability to make decisions suggests a more complex conception
of temporality than contemporary theory’s abstract opposition of the
necessary temporal continuity of grand narrative and the liberatory
temporal dispersal of its disruption. His decisions are not the free and
spontaneous productions of the self-identical subject of master narrative,
but nor are they the irruption of contingency and indeterminacy that
contemporary theory has imagined as its other. Absent the determining
connectivity of events promised by historicism and the overarching
restitution of origin recalled by a phenomenology of authenticity, there
is nonetheless a kind of temporal connectivity here that escapes the
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blanket denunciation of continuity and memory in grand narrative: in the
retention of past operations and iterations and the accretion of an affective
habitus or disposition over time—“call it muscle memory, whatever,”
suggests Leonard offhandedly at one point (Nolan 2001, 136). And while
it offers neither epistemological certainty nor ontological grounding, such
an affective disposition is not without a kind of meaningfulness, albeit
one that cycles willy-nilly through anger, empathy, innocence, and guilt.
As Leonard confides on the phone to his unseen confessor: “with my
condition, you don’t know anything . . . you feel angry, guilty, you don’t
know why. You could do something terrible and not have the faintest idea
ten minutes later” (200).
The banal time of Memento’s ruthlessly innocent violence may shed
some light on the perplexing concision of Hannah Arendt’s discussion of
the “banality of evil” in the postscript to her Eichmann in Jerusalem. There
she writes that,
Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been
farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III “to prove
a villain.” Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his
personal advancement, he had no motives at all. . . . He merely, to put the
matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing. (Arendt 1965, 287)

It might reasonably be objected that in this formulation Arendt reduces
perpetrators like Eichmann to automatons or cyphers defined only by a
“lack of imagination” (287), denying them their all too human motivations,
foibles, nuances, and agency by perversely contrasting them to literary
figures whose complexity of character and psychological depth has been
the subject of scholarly debate for generations. Or as Ronit Lentin presents
this objection elsewhere in this special issue, Arendt’s “banality thesis
negates the possibility that perpetrators of atrocities . . . are complex
human beings, performing intentional acts, rather than demonic or banal
creatures” (246). But in light of the banal time of Memento traced here, such
a reading can be seen to restrict banality within the abstract opposition of
master narrative and temporal disruption, as the other pole—emotionless,
absent of meaningfulness, and deprived of decision and agency—to the
master narrative of the “demonic”—where all complexity, guilt, and
innocence would be said to reside. But as Memento suggests, banal time
is not the other of grand narrative, not its lack or absence or disruption
or deconstruction. And Leonard is not without suffering, complexity,
innocence, or guilt. As Teddy says to him in one of the film’s most
powerfully ironic moments, “You’re not a killer, Lenny. That’s why you
are so good at it” (Nolan 2001, 223).
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This is in contrast to the current protests about flying the Confederate battle flag
on public buildings. While one flag is currently overshadowed by the controversy
over the other, the one’s visibility and the other’s invisibility are linked by their
shared syntax of display: as public markers of affective dispositions whose
signifying power lies in the public claim that they are denied publicity.
Among other items, Amazon currently lists for sale a “POW/MIA Not
Forgotten” one-piece infant bodysuit in sizing for 6, 12, 18, and 24 months and
with color options in white, light blue, and light pink.
See Franklin (2001, 48). A similar point is made also using Schell’s observation
by Tran (2010, 276) and Perlstein (2014, 13).
For Fredric Jameson, this absolute loss of meaning and identity was to define
the very condition of post-Vietnam America, which he was to generalize
aesthetically as “postmodernity”: “the breakdown of temporality suddenly
releases this present of time. . . . thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs
the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly
overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material . . .
signifier in isolation” (1991, 27). For a critique of Jameson’s aesthetic conception
of politics see MacPhee (2002, 87–95).
For a fuller account of the theoretical assumptions built into the abstract
opposition of grand narrative and temporal disruption see MacPhee (2011a).
An early and influential statement of the current orthodoxy is provided by
Derek Attridge and Geoff Bennington’s collection Post-Structuralism and the
Question of History. As they write in their introduction, post-structuralism is to be
conceived as an absolutized “resistance to totalization and synthesis” (1987, 9). As
Bennington makes clear in his contribution to the volume, what is being resisted
is “the Left” (18). For a more nuanced vision of the relationship between Derrida’s
thinking and the Left Hegelian tradition, see Beardsworth (1996, 46–97).
The official title of what became known as The Pentagon Papers is the Report of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (1969). The entire report is
available online at www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers. The excerpts
printed in the New York Times in 1971 were published in book form by Bantam
as The Pentagon Papers that same year. For a more current illustration of the
recurrence of these conditions of apperception in the decision-making of
the political and military bureaucracy, see Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen’s
comparison of the US bombing of Cambodia and of Afghanistan (2010).
Which is not to say that Ellsberg did not care for the civilian and noncombatant
casualties inflicted by the US in Southeast Asia, as he makes clear for example
in “Murder in Laos” (see especially 1972, 270–71). In his memoir Secrets,
Ellsberg notes that, “ironically, the realities from which we were drawing
our conclusions were known to most people in the world. They were hidden
only from those who believed the public lies of the US government” (2002,
281). This situation was recently repeated most strikingly in the run up to US
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
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Ellsberg records that “no other volumes of the papers . . . had so great an
impact on my perspective toward the war” (2002, 274). However, this shift in
his perspective also needs to be set alongside his personal experience of the
activism of a generation of draft resisters (see 271–72). He writes, “for me as
an American to read, in our own official secret documents, about the origins
of the conflict and of our participation in it was to see our involvement—and
the killing we had done and were still doing—naked of any shred of legitimacy
from the beginning. That strengthened and extended backwards in time the
conclusion I had drawn in May, in Ohio; the immorality of our deliberately
prolonging the killing by a single additional day, or bomb, or death” (256).
10
The editors of Postcolonial Studies and Beyond argue that that in order to address the
global inequalities of power and resources, we may “need to keep alive particular
metanarratives” and the collective subjectivities they sustain (Loomba et al. 2005,
34). For an earlier statement of the problematic nature of Bhabha’s nomination of
“the indeterminate” as the “basis” for “freedom,” see MacPhee (1996).
11
Richard Milhous Nixon ran in the 1968 presidential election promising to
achieve an “honorable end to the war,” which later became the slogan “peace
with honor” (McMahon and Zeiler 2012, 628). Nixon asked rhetorically “Can
the President of the United States sitting in the office with responsibility for
four hundred POWs . . . withdraw all of our forces as long as the enemy holds
one American as a prisoner of war” (Schell 1975, 76). As Ellsberg recounts,
“What lay ahead, as I saw it: an endless, expanding war” (2002, 347).
12
The POW/MIA issue delayed the restoration of diplomatic and economic
relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until
1995. As H. Bruce Franklin notes, this delay allowed the United States to avoid
providing the reconstruction aid that the Nixon administration had promised
in the Paris Peace Agreement, so crippling the economic development of the
impoverished country (1993, 122–23). As Franklin notes in the 1992 election,
“no national candidate ever made an issue of America’s ongoing economic and
political war against Vietnam” (192–93).
The National League of Families POW/MIA flag is legally designated as
“the symbol of our nation’s concern and commitment to resolving as fully as
possible the fates of Americans still prisoner, missing, and unaccounted for in
Southeast Asia” according to the United States Legal Code, and is required to
be flown over specified government building on certain days each year; see 36
U. S. C., § 902 (2002).
13
The POW/MIA issue was an important driver for Ross Perot’s third party
presidential challenge in 1992 (Franklin 1993, 188–89). The movement also had
a significant impact in damaging the presidential election bids of Senator John
McCain and, in concert with the Swift boat veterans group, Senator John Kerry
(Allen 2009, 292–301).
14
I develop this reading of Homi Bhabha’s position in more detail in MacPhee
2011b, 100–106.
9
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Jonathan Tran describes the POW/MIA movement as offering “not only a
myth but a counter-myth that fissures every claim of totality by questioning
the greatness of a nation that would forget for convenience” (2010, 279).
16
As Michael J. Allen writes, “caught in the middle of a war without end,
[the prisoners of war] and their families became stand-ins for millions of
Americans who had lost faith in the war but were unable to escape it” (2009,
61). An anticipation of this configuration of temporality is provided by Walter
Benjamin in an essay written in 1930, “Theories of German Fascism.” Here he
introduces the concept of the “postwar war” (Nachkrieg): “the victor retains the
war, the vanquished misplaces it. . . . The victor annexes the war for himself,
makes it his own property; the vanquished no longer possesses it and must live
without it” (1999, 315). For a reading of the temporality of the “postwar war,” see
MacPhee (2000).
17
For a diagrammatic representation of the sequence of scenes, see Kania 2009,
3–4; and Klein 2001.
18
This account of banal time is the corollary of the reading of Arendt’s conception
of banality that I develop in the introduction to this special issue: see especially
8–13 above. In Arendt’s view, “the pleasure in this mere functioning . . . was
quite evident in Eichmann” (2013, 44). “He wanted to go along with the rest,
. . . he wanted to say ‘we,’” she observes, “and going-along-with-the-rest and
wanting-to-say-we like this were quite enough to make the greatest of all
crimes possible” (43).
19
Alan S. Brown explains that, “whereas déjà vu involves an experience of
inappropriate familiarity, one can also experience the opposite illusion of
recognition: inappropriate unfamiliarity, or jamais vu. More specifically,
a jamais vu experience involves an objectively familiar situation that feels
unfamiliar, such as walking into your bedroom and momentarily having no
sense of familiarity associated with the setting. Whereas the translation of déjà
vu means ‘already seen,’ jamais vu means ‘never seen’” (2004, 103).
15
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